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TOWARDS A MODEL FOR MEASURING HOLISTIC PERFORMANCE OF 
PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL CLUBS 
 
Abstract: This paper introduces an experimental model to measure the holistic performance 
of professional football clubs. The model utilises a selection of established financial and 
sporting indicators, which are weighted in accordance with their perceived relative 
importance and in relation to components of financial management and governing body 
regulations. The paper uses data pertaining to clubs competing in the English Premier League 
to demonstrate the outputs of the model. The authors argue that although the model is 
experimental, it still provides a useful platform to analyse performance of football clubs 
through further scientific investigation. 
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Substantial increases in revenue have been well documented in European football in recent 
years. Indeed, the European football market continued to show resistance to wider economic 
pressures, growing by 4% to €16.9 billion in 2010/11 (Deloitte, 2012). However, in light of 
such economic pressures, Drut and Raballand (2012) state that debt accumulation of 
European football clubs is an increasing source of concern for football authorities. 
Furthermore, there is an argument that a turning point has been reached after Portsmouth 
Football Club in England became the first club in a major domestic league to enter 
administration in 2010, coupled with the threat of many other European clubs encountering 
similar problems. Subsequently, the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) has 
introduced its Financial Fair Play (FFP) regulations across the European game in an attempt 
to alleviate debt and encourage clubs to spend within their means. As detailed later in the 
paper, there are areas of FFP that appear to be somewhat simplistic and consequently the 
authors argue that a more holistic approach to analysing performance of professional football 
clubs is required supplementary to the actual regulations enforced by the football authorities. 
The paper is structured as follows. The main legislative and theoretical issues are discussed 
before an experimental performance assessment model (hereafter referred to as ExPAM) is 
introduced. The ExPAM is then applied to a sample dataset that includes football clubs from 
the English Premier League (EPL) to demonstrate its workings and outputs. Finally, the 
limitations of the ExPAM are acknowledged and future direction for the formation of a more 
definitive model discussed.  
The Economics of European Football 
The most recent set of figures available from Deloitte (2012) indicate that revenues of the 'big 
five' leagues (the EPL in England, the Bundesliga in Germany, La Liga in Spain, Serie A in 
Italy and Ligue 1 in France) grew collectively by 2% in to €8.6 billion in 2010/11. Alongside 
this market growth, academics within the sport management field have become increasingly 
interested in the financial performance of professional football clubs during the last decade 
and the academic literature surrounding the subject has grown substantially during this time. 
Entire textbooks are now dedicated to the subject (see Dobson and Goddard, 2011; 
Szymanski and Kuypers, 1999; Hamil and Chadwick, 2010; Conn, 2000 and Morrow, 2003 
among others), whilst the financial performance of football clubs across Europe have been 
scrutinised in a number of peer reviewed journal articles (see Andreff, 2007; Ascari and 
Gagnepain, 2007; Barros, 2006; Buraimo, Simmons and Syzmanski, 2006; Dietl and Franck, 
2007; Dimitropoulos, 2010). It is within these journal articles that the imbalance between 
revenues and costs in the top European leagues, namely England, Spain, Germany, Italy and 
France, is outlined. It is clear that a paradox between revenues and costs exists in European 
football and UEFA have since intervened with the introduction of FFP. 
UEFA FFP 
Financial discipline is an essential element of FFP which, among other things, seek to curb 
the spiralling transfer fees, and the main component of the regulations - the 'break-even' 
requirement - will come into force for financial statements in the reporting period ending 
2012. Under the break-even requirement clubs may not spend more than the income they 
generate. Clubs will also be assessed on a risk basis, in which debt and salary levels are taken 
into consideration and they will also have to ensure that liabilities are paid in a punctual 
manner (UEFA, 2010). 
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Admittedly, there are areas of FFP that will take time to implement and there are also 
considerable grey areas within the proposals. Following transitional implementation, the 
aggregate break-even result will be the sum of three reporting periods (T, T-1 and T-2), plus 
the surplus (if any) of the preceding two periods (T-3 and T-4). If a club has an aggregate 
break-even surplus, or a deficit which is within the acceptable deviation, then the break-even 
requirement is fulfilled. Initially the acceptable deviation is €5m or up to €45m if the excess 
over €5m is covered by unconditional contributions from equity participants and/or related 
parties (which relates to cash injections from wealthy owners and/or investors). This upper 
threshold will reduce to €30m from 2015/16, and a lower amount (to be defined) from 
2018/19 (Deloitte, 2012). UEFA go on to state that: 
 "…the regulations do not impose a limit on owner investment, but do seek to limit a 
 club's losses over time whilst encouraging owner funding to be directed more 
 towards spending on facilities and activities for the longer term benefit of football." 
          (Deloitte, 2012; 71) 
Such regulations would require many clubs to reinvent their respective business models, 
whether in a period of economic uncertainty or not. UEFA's stance is that the FFP measures 
are not a means of punishing clubs but a way of helping them and also to help improve 
financial standards in European football. However, anecdotally at least, it would appear that 
many clubs - particularly in England - would struggle to reach the break-even requirement at 
the present time. Indeed, the results of a simulation exercise by UEFA for reporting periods 
ending in 2008-10 illustrated that 35 (16%) of the clubs in UEFA club competitions for the 
2011/12 season had an aggregate break-even deficit of greater than €5m. Of these, 12 clubs 
had an aggregate deficit within the €45m upper threshold which was covered by contributions, 
leaving 23 clubs from across Europe that appear not to satisfy the break-even requirement 
had the regulations been in place at that time (Deloitte, 2012).  
There is also scope within the requirements for clubs to enhance future sponsorship deals to 
increase revenue streams and to commit funds to enhance training facilities and talent 
development in accordance with UEFA's licensing requirements on youth development. 
Manchester City is a particularly relevant case with respect to the issues raised above. The 
club recorded an annual loss of £194.9m in 2011, the biggest in English football history, and 
a £73.9m increase on the previous year (2010) where the club lost £121m. However, this 
figure does not take into account the club's sponsorship deal with Etihad Airlines, worth an 
estimated £400m over ten years, or the income from their 2010/11 Champions League 
campaign. The club continue to work closely with UEFA and insist that the club will comply 
with FFP and that the losses sustained in the meantime are necessary for the club to become 
sustainable and grow in the future.  
There is more concern that certain clubs in other European leagues - where the brand is 
weaker than the EPL and television revenues and media exposure are not as high - could be 
in danger in relation to the new regulations. Recently, Italian club Juventus announced plans 
to raise €120m through a share sale to combat the worst financial loss in the club's history 
(losses of €95.4m were revealed for the year ending June 2011), whilst the financial problems 
Valencia has encountered in recent seasons are well documented, highlighting the dominance 
of Real Madrid and Barcelona in La Liga and the financial gulf between these two clubs and 
the rest of the Spanish first division clubs. The Bundesliga's club ownership model and the 
50+1 rule (see Dietl and Franck, 2007) has been praised in recent years but clubs such as 
Schalke 04 and Borussia Dortmund have recently encountered financial problems and the 
way in which clubs are run in Germany may need to be revised in the near future. 
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UEFA has undoubtedly laid strong foundations with FFP and there are a number of 
advantages to the proposals. The regulations can help clubs in their negotiations to better 
rationalise their player costs (both wages and transfer fees), limiting inflationary increases 
and, potentially, implementing pay structures that are more strongly based on a club's on-
pitch results and the consequent financial implications (Deloitte, 2012). There is an argument, 
however, that FFP will actually achieve very little, other than to further widen the gap 
between the more established clubs that regularly compete in European competitions and 
those that do not. FFP is directly related to clubs who wish to apply for a UEFA license and 
qualify for European competitions; yet most European clubs wish to conform to the 
regulations. This makes sense, as running the club as a sustainable business should be a 
priority, but the spending power and commercial appeal of the more established clubs will 
make it very difficult for the so called 'lesser' clubs to catch up and level out the financial 
playing field. Even then, the top clubs will continue to generate more revenue from 
maintained on-pitch success and driving commercial revenues off-pitch meaning that they 
will have more money to invest in player talent than other clubs under the 'spending within 
your means' principle outline by UEFA in FFP. 
Despite the strong foundations laid by UEFA within FFP, the regulations effectively only 
analyse a club's capacity to break-even and the regulations offer only suggested guidelines 
with regards to wage costs. In light of the increasing paradox between revenues and costs 
referenced previously it is also pertinent for clubs to consider their financial sustainability, 
taking into account a number of different factors, which are not solely limited to financial 
measures. Football and finance are now so inextricably linked that it is often easy to overlook 
the essential element of the game; winning a football match on the pitch in order to gain 
points to move further up the league table. However, as discussed later, the on-pitch 
performance of a club is arguably related to its financial performance, although there is no 
apparent consensus on which one is the cause and which one is the effect. In this context, the 
author's offer a more holistic model of performance assessment that incorporates a number of 
factors, both sporting and financial, which the authors deem to be valid in relation to 
principles of financial management and FFP. 
Measuring Financial Performance in Sport 
Reconciling the "on-field/off field" dichotomy in professional team sport is not easy and it 
has proved a highly contentious issue in recent years (Chadwick, 2009). Nevertheless, there is 
already partial recognition that on-field and off-field performances may be linked (e.g. 
Cornwall, Pruitt and Van Ness, 2001). It is within the measurement of both on-field and off-
field performance that grey areas remain and the overriding conclusion is that there is 
currently no set definition as to what measures to include each time. Despite this, however, 
there is convergence in certain areas. One of the most popular forms of measurement is ratio 
analysis. Ratio analysis can be a very effective method of making objective statements about 
an organisation. Many academic textbooks refer to the processes of ratio analysis and the 
ratios calculated are normally divided into five different sections under the headings of 
growth, profitability, liquidity, return on capital employed (ROCE) and defensive positioning 
(Wilson, 2011). The measurement of variables under these headings have been utilised 
extensively in academic research, ranging across different industries. Indeed, Feng and Wang 
(2000), Sueyoshi (2005) and Ponikvar, Tajnikar and Pusnik (2009) all incorporated similar 
areas of financial performance, namely debt, liquidity and profitability, in their respective 
analysis of the airline industry, the American power/energy industry and the Slovenian 
manufacturing industry. Furthermore, to supplement the use of ratio analysis, both Sueyoshi 
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(2005) and Ponikvar, Tajnikar and Pusnik (2009), used more detailed statistical approaches to 
data analysis which is more closely related to Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). 
DEA has often been used to augment ratio analysis in academic papers (see Feroz, Kim and 
Raab, 2003; Yeh, 1996) and is a popular tool to analyse efficiency in many fields, such as 
banking (Hauner, 2005) and financial services (Fiordelisi and Molyneux, 2004). It is a 
mathematical programming methodology that can be applied to assess the relative efficiency 
of a variety of institutions using a variety of input and output data (Yeh, 1996). Readers are 
referred to the work of Haas (2003) for a more detailed discussion of DEA. Guzman and 
Morrow (2007) provide an example of how DEA can be applied to the EPL, highlighting a 
number of inputs that relate to the various expenses of football clubs derived from the 
financial statements and outputs such as points won in a season and total revenue for the 
corresponding financial year (see Guzman and Morrow, 2007). One of the key concerns with 
the majority of studies that focus on measuring performance is that, at the present time, there 
appears to be no set definition as to which measures should be applied. Rather, it is the author 
who selects the measures entirely at their discretion in order to best fit the industry that the 
research focuses on. Furthermore, in relation to the professional football industry, there is a 
need to consider on-field factors as well, or non-financial measures as defined by Romero 
Castro and Pineiro Chousa (2006). They also outline the importance of weighting factors to 
add robustness to the analysis but state that it has been commonplace for analysts to assign an 
equal weight to all ratios considered in the analysis. This, however, could be argued as being 
too simplistic and the opportunity to uncover more purposeful results may ultimately come 
from the application of weighting each ratio or variable in terms of its importance. 
Subsequently, this paper attempts to enhance the research in this area by proposing an 
experimental model that considers both financial and sporting variables and weights them in 
accordance to their perceived importance and relevance to UEFA FFP. 
Measuring Sporting Performance 
The rationale put forward above by UEFA suggests that it would be beneficial for a club's 
pay structure to be more strongly aligned to the club's on-pitch results. This relates to the 
debate surrounding profit and utility maximisation (see Dobson and Goddard, 2011 among 
others) and further underlines the fact that financial and sporting performance in professional 
football are closely linked. In essence, UEFA argue that the financial performance of football 
club should be driven by its performance on the pitch. In recent years, conversely, there have 
been examples of financial performance driving what happens on the pitch (e.g. the cases of 
Chelsea and Manchester City where a wealthy investor has injected money to pay for better 
players and higher wages in order to fund short term success on the pitch). To understand 
further how the two components (financial and sporting) are connected it is important to 
obtain an understanding of some of the factors that affect the sporting performance of 
professional team sports. 
Playing success versus financial success 
Szymanski and Kuypers (1999) argued that there are three possibilities when considering the 
relationship between playing success and financial success (or, to use their definition, profit 
and performance). First, higher profits might automatically lead to better team performance 
and greater playing success might lead to greater profit, so that there would be no conflict 
between trying to satisfy the fans' desire for success or the shareholders' desire for profit. 
Second, playing success might be unrelated to profitability meaning that the pursuit of profit 
would not interfere with playing success or vice versa. Lastly, playing success might 
automatically lead to lower profits, in which case shareholders would have to decide upon the 
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appropriate trade-off between profit and playing performance. Upon correlating the 
relationship between profit and league position for forty football clubs between 1978 and 
1997 Szymanski and Kuypers (1999) found little evidence of a powerful relationship between 
changes in league position and changes in profit, implying that there is no simple formula that 
relates financial success to success on the pitch. However, as stated by Szymanski and 
Kuypers (1999), in the past, when club directors did not place great emphasis on financial 
success, this did not matter. In recent years, directors have become more concerned with the 
creation of financial profits from football. Using a more inclusive range of indicators of 
financial and sporting performance Wilson, Plumley and Ramchandani (2013) revealed that, 
in the EPL, the stock market model of ownership returned better financial health relative to 
privately owned (domestic and foreign) clubs; however, clubs owned privately by foreign 
investors or on the stock market performed better in the league in comparison with 
domestically owned clubs.  They also suggested that the stock market model was more likely 
to comply with FFP regulations. 
Furthermore, there are arguments put forward in recent literature that relate to motivations of 
new foreign owners of EPL clubs. Garcia-del-Barrio and Szymanski (2009) reference the 
number of sports franchise owners from North America who have recently acquired control 
of EPL clubs (the Glazer family and Manchester United; Randy Lerner at Aston Villa; Tom 
Hicks and George Gillett previously at Liverpool and now John W. Henry) and deliberate 
whether or not profit maximisers could successfully invade a population of win maximisers 
(and vice versa). It appears as though this could be a possibility although there is currently no 
empirical evidence to support this and Andreff (2011) argues that historically the European 
open market model has been more closely related to utility maximisation or win 
maximisation operating under a soft budget constraint. It is apparent in previous literature 
that the choice of variables is often at the discretion of the authors. Financial performance can 
be measured by more than just the profit figure taken from the club accounts, just as playing 
performance can consist of a number of different variables in addition to league position. 
Uncertainty of outcome 
Perhaps the most fundamental aspect of professional football - an aspect that makes the 
product an attractive one and perhaps explains to some extent the exponential rises in revenue 
in recent years - is competition. As previously stated, it is not beneficial for one football team 
to establish a monopoly owing to the joint 'production' of team sports (Dobson and Goddard, 
2011). On the pitch, at least, teams need other teams to compete against in order to be able to 
survive. Economists have often championed the argument that the greatest benefits to a team 
is where the competition is close to equal (i.e. either team in any one match has an equal 
chance of winning that match). This is known as uncertainty of outcome - a term used 
exclusively in economics but it also has implications for both financial and sporting 
performance in professional team sports.   
Uncertainty of outcome not only relates to how competitive a match is predicted to be; it can 
also influence gate attendance and, more broadly, television viewing figures. For example, in 
investigating the state of competitiveness in top division football leagues in ten European 
countries, Ramchandani (2012) found a moderately strong, albeit insignificant, effect of a 
league's competitive balance on attendance levels. As the probability of either team winning 
approaches one, it is possible that gate receipts may fall substantially. Morrow (2003) 
believed this to be a significant problem for the football industry in England stating that if 
viewers perceive games as one-sided then viewing figures may fall accordingly. However, 
this is not reflected in the live game fixture lists on pay-per-view channels. The trend since 
the late 1990s has been that the so called 'big' clubs, or clubs that are more likely to finish 
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higher up the league table, have been selected for live television coverage more often than 
teams at the bottom end of the league. Indeed, the latest figures support the trend owing to the 
fact that the teams shown the most number of times on live television in 2011/12 - 
Manchester United (26 live games), Manchester City (25) and Tottenham (23) -  also 
happened to be the clubs that occupied three of the top four league positions in the same 
season. Despite the concerns of Morrow (2003), and the wider implications for competitive 
balance, Simmons (2008) does not view this as a particular problem. Conversely, Simmons 
(2008) found that an increase in uncertainty of outcome is actually more associated with 
reduced gate attendance implying that, ultimately, fans (in particular fans of the home team) 
prefer to see their team play an inferior team and beat them.  
The vast majority of literature surrounding the economics of professional team sports is 
concerned with competitive balance or competitive imbalance. Indeed, Dobson and Goddard 
(2011) assert that the problem of measuring competitive balance or competitive inequality 
within a sports league has attracted considerable attention in the sports economics literature 
in recent years. Researchers have applied several measures of concentration or inequality, 
some of which are borrowed from industrial economics, to sports teams' win ratio or league 
points data (Dobson and Goddard, 2011). However, the economic aspects of sporting 
performance (in general sports economics textbooks) are often considered in isolation and 
there is little reference as to how these can be linked together with financial performance 
factors to contribute to an overall measure of performance. 
The Proposed Model 
To enable the calculation of an overall performance score (OPS), the paper utilises an 
adaptation of the FOrNeX model (see Andrikopoulos and Kaimenakis, 2009) which outlines 
how the intellectual capital of a football club is measured. In their paper, through the 
application of a holistic approach to the organisational analysis of a football club the authors 
build an intellectual capital map of a clubs' value-creating intangible resources, such as player 
talent, fan base and athletic performance. The culmination of this approach is the Football 
Organisation Nexus Index (FOrNeX), a decision-making instrument based on a 
multidimensional approach to a football club's organisational performance (Andrikopoulos 
and Kaimenakis, 2009). The authors produce an exploratory study which outlines an 
approach that could be followed. This paper aims to adapt this approach to produce an 
experimental model, offering an exploratory insight into how the model could be constructed 
to measure both financial and sporting performance of professional football clubs. The 
FOrNeX model applies a weighted average methodology, drawing on the Balanced Scorecard 
model of Kaplan and Norton (1996). Furthermore, in practice, the model proposed by 
Andrikopoulos and Kaimenakis (2009) relies heavily in cooperating with league decision-
makers so as to assign the correct magnitude to each weight. For this paper, the measures and 
weights are assigned by the authors in relation to their perceived relevance to FFP and 
principles of financial management. It is envisaged that the robustness of the experimental 
model will be developed through future research using a wider range of methodological 
techniques. An explanation of the indicators used in the ExPAM is shown in Table1 and the 
mechanics of the model are summarised in Table 2. 
<TABLE 1 HERE> 
The weights attached to the financial indicators (in Table 2) are assigned broadly in 
accordance with UEFA FFP. Within FFP clubs will be monitored on a number of factors, 
most notably break-even, but also clubs are advised to make sure that wages do not exceed 70% 
of turnover and that debt levels do not exceed 100%. To this end, these two factors have been 
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assigned the greatest weight within the financial performance domain. Additionally, the 
wages/turnover ratio can be classed as an efficiency measure rather than an economy measure 
owing to the fact that there are two measures for this indicator as opposed to one. The gearing 
ratio, a measure of defensive positioning, is also associated with debt and is given a 10% 
weight.  The remaining financial indicators are assigned a weight of between 5% and 10% 
depending on their perceived fit with the break-even requirement.  Turnover increase is the 
most obvious factor linked to break-even as is the profit percentage for each year. 
Accordingly, each of these factors has been assigned a weighting factor of 10%. Furthermore, 
the current ratio is also linked to break-even as it outlines how capable a business is at paying 
its liabilities as they fall due. Arguably the least two important factors in relation to FFP are 
profit increase and return on capital employed (each assigned a 5% weighting). Profit 
increase is less relevant than year on year profit as this is effectively a by-product of the 
profit figure for each year. Similarly, return on capital employed is not considered to be of 
great importance to owners of modern day football clubs, evidenced by the shift from public 
to private ownership of professional football clubs during the last 10 years (see for example, 
Wilson, Plumley and Ramchandani, 2013). 
For the ExPAM, three sporting factors have been included to provide a more holistic analysis 
- win ratio, league points and capacity utilisation. Evidence from the preceding literature 
review (see Szymanski and Kuypers (1999) and Guzman and Morrow, 2007 among others) 
suggests that financial and sporting performance is inextricably linked. For example, a higher 
win ratio may lead to higher gate receipts which will in turn contribute to turnover. Win ratio 
has been assigned the highest weight of the sporting factors. League points will be a by-
product of win ratio and is assigned a 10% weighting. The third sporting factor, capacity 
utilisation, is a measure of the number of seats sold in relation to stadium capacity. As 
previously stated, this may affect club turnover and subsequent profit. This indicator is not, 
therefore, strictly limited to sporting performance even though it has been categorised as such 
for the purpose of this study.  
<TABLE 2 HERE> 
For each dimension of performance (financial and sporting) a weight is assigned which sums 
to 1. The performance of the football club is the weighted average of the performance in both 
these dimensions. Within these two dimensions of performance there are a number of 
indicators which are also weighted and sum to 1 so each club has a dimension score for each 
sub-domain (using the Hypothetical league rank column) which is then used to calculate the 
overall performance score for each club. The league rank for each sub-domain is derived 
from how well a club is performing in relation to other clubs in the league on that indicator. 
For each sub-domain, the league rank will range from 1 (best performance) to n (worst 
performance) - the latter is categorised by how many teams compete in the league. Therefore, 
a team with the best turnover figure in a given year will score 1; the team with the second 
best turnover figure will score 2 and so on. Turnover increase has a weight of 0.10 which is 
multiplied by the hypothetical league rank of 2 to give an indicator score of 0.20. The sum of 
all sub domain scores for finance gives a dimension score of 3.20. Similarly, the sum of all 
sporting sub domain scores gives a dimension score of 3.90. These two dimension scores are 
then multiplied by their individual dimension weight to produce an OPS of 3.41. A lower 
OPS is more desirable owing to the fact that clubs are ranked against each other (i.e. the 




The Proposed Model in Practice 
Having defined the various inputs to the ExPAM and the relative importance attached to both 
financial and sporting dimensions as well as that of the specific indicators that make up each 
dimension, we now proceed to consider a real-world example.  In order to do this, we have 
used five years' data between 2006 and 2010 from a sample of clubs competing in the EPL.  
A total of 13 clubs were included in the analysis (see Table 3), the criteria for inclusion being 
two-fold:  first, clubs must have been part of the EPL in the above mentioned time frame 
consistently; and, second, the availability of annual data for each club during this period 
pertaining to all indicators of financial and sporting performance as identified within the 
proposed holistic club performance assessment model.  Adopting this approach meant that it 
was possible to compare and contrast the performance of individual clubs, as revealed by the 
proposed model, on a like for like basis over time.  The data required to calculate the 
financial ratios was collated from scrutiny of clubs' company accounts whereas the sporting 
indicators were calculated from publically available sources on the internet. 
The application of EPL data to the ExPAM to indicates that the most successful performers in 
recent years have been Arsenal (2008 and 2010), Manchester United (2007 and 2009) and 
West Ham (2006).  On the other hand, the clubs emerging as the least successful include 
Fulham (2006 and 2008) and Wigan (2007, 2009 and 2010).  Taken across the five-year 
period, there is a strong, statistically significant, correlation between clubs' OPS and financial 
performance ranks (r = 0.84, n = 65, p = 0.00).  The strength of this relationship might be 
expected given that the finance dimension was allocated a 70% weighting to derive the 
weighted index score for each club.  The relationships between clubs' OPS and sporting 
performance and between the financial and sporting dimensions are also moderately strong 
and statistically significant (0.63 < r < 0.67, n = 65, p = 0.00).  This latter finding supports the 
view that the pursuit of financial and sporting objectives by professional football clubs is not 
necessarily mutually exclusive (see for example, Wilson, Plumley and Ramchandani, 2013).  
<TABLE 3 HERE>  
Further scrutiny of the data using correlation analysis (see Figure 1) illustrates that, with the 
passage of time, comparative overall performance has remained relatively unchanged for two 
of the 13 clubs - Tottenham and Chelsea (0.00 < r < 0.22) - declined either moderately or 
strongly for five clubs - Liverpool, Manchester City, Wigan, West Ham and Bolton - (0.53 < 
r < 0.85 ) - and improved either moderately or strongly for the remaining six clubs - 
Blackburn, Everton, Arsenal, Manchester United, Fulham and Aston Villa (-0.93 < r < -0.53).  
A caveat to this interpretation is that, with the exception of Aston Villa, the club-specific 
trends are not statistically significant (p > 0.05) on account of the limited number of 
observations per club (n = 5) based on the time period under review.  Nonetheless, there is 
indicative evidence that, for the majority of these clubs, overall performance, as measured 
using a mix of financial and sporting indicators, varies over time.  
<FIGURE 1 HERE> 
Concluding Comments 
This paper has introduced an experimental model to measure performance of professional 
football clubs. The model incorporates selected financial and sporting indicators to provide a 
more holistic view of clubs' performance.  The development of the model is based on two key 
judgments: first, the choice key performance indicators used; and, second, the weighting 
factors attached to the chosen indicators.  Whilst these have been constructed to broadly 
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reflect the requirements set out in UEFA FFP and principles of financial management in 
general, the authors do not claim that the ExPAM is definitive. Nonetheless, it provides a 
useful platform for more rigorous scrutiny.  In particular, future research efforts should 
endeavour to make the judgement aspects of the analysis more scientific and create a model 
that is derived statistically and is better defined. This may include, for example, using 
techniques such as factor analysis to determine the relationship between performance 
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Table 1: Indicators and their interpretations 
Indicator Calculation Interpretation 
Turnover 
Increase (%) 
(This year's turnover - Last year's turnover) / 
Last year's turnover 
Higher score is more desirable 
Profit Increase 
(%) 
(This year's profit(loss) after taxation - Last 
year's profit(loss) after taxation) / Last year's 
profit(loss) after taxation 
Higher score is more desirable 
Profit (%) 
After tax return on sales as a percentage of 
turnover 
Higher score is more desirable 
ROCE (%) 
Profit after taxation as a percentage of net 
assets 
Higher score is more desirable 
Current Ratio Current assets / Current liability Higher score is more desirable 
Debt (%) 
The absolute amount of debt divided by total 
fixed assets and current assets put together 
Lower score is more desirable 
Gearing (%) 
Total amount of borrowings both short and 
long term. Calculated as gearing percentage 
of shareholders' funds 
Lower score is more desirable 
Wages/Turnover 
(%) 
Total wage costs as a percentage of turnover Lower score is more desirable 
Win Ratio Percentages of games won during a season Higher score is more desirable 
League Points 
Number of league points gained during a 
season 
Higher score is more desirable 
Capacity 
Utilisation (%) 
Average attendance for a season/Capacity of 
the stadium 
Higher score is more desirable 
 
Table 2: A holistic ExPAM for a football club 
Dimension 




league rank  
Weight Score Score Weight 
Financial 
Turnover Increase 2 0.10 0.20 
3.20 0.70 
3.41 
Profit Increase 4 0.05 0.20 
Profit (Year) 3 0.10 0.30 
ROCE 8 0.05 0.40 
Current ratio 4 0.10 0.40 
Debt 1 0.20 0.20 
Gearing 3 0.10 0.30 
Wages/Turnover 4 0.30 1.20 
Sporting 
Win ratio 5 0.70 3.50 
3.90 0.30 League Points 2 0.10 0.20 




Table 3: OPS and dimension ranks for EPL clubs 2006-10 
Club 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Finance Sport Overall Finance Sport Overall Finance Sport Overall Finance Sport Overall Finance Sport Overall 
Arsenal 2 4 2 4 3 3 1 3 1 2 4 2 1 3 1 
Aston Villa 7 13 11 6 10 8 6 6 5 5 5 5 4 7 4 
Blackburn 12 6 12 7 9 7 5 8 6 6 13 10 5 9 6 
Bolton  9 8 9 9 7 10 9 13 12 9 12 11 11 11 12 
Chelsea 11 1 7 10 2 5 13 2 9 12 2 7 12 2 7 
Everton 10 10 10 11 6 11 7 5 7 8 6 6 7 8 9 
Fulham 13 11 13 12 12 12 10 12 13 7 9 8 8 10 10 
Liverpool 5 3 3 5 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 3 6 6 5 
Manchester City 4 12 6 3 11 6 8 7 8 13 9 12 9 5 8 
Manchester United 6 2 5 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 2 
Tottenham 3 5 4 1 5 2 3 10 4 3 7 4 2 4 3 
West Ham 1 7 1 8 8 9 11 9 10 10 8 9 10 12 11 
Wigan 8 9 8 13 13 13 12 11 11 11 11 13 13 13 13 
13 
 
Figure 1: Correlation between OPS and time (2006 = 1; 2010 = 5) by club 
 
Note: A higher (positive) value correlation coefficient in this instance implies an inverse relationship with time (i.e. declining trend in club 
performance) whereas a lower (negative) value correlation coefficient implies an improvement over time. 
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